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In this note I discuss the effect of the ECB’s new long-term refinancing 
operations (LTROs) on bank lending to the real economy and on sovereign debt 
markets. I also discuss the implication of its change in collateral policy.
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 On 8 December 2011 the Governing Council of the ECB unveiled two new policy 
measures: two very long term full-allotment refinancing operations and a relaxation 
of collateral requirements.
 Bank lending to the private sector had been in marked decline and the new 
refinancing measures did not lead to a rebound. They did, perhaps however, slow 
the rate of deterioration.
 The new measures were an immediate success in calming financial markets. Yields 
on euro area periphery sovereign debt declined markedly and global equity markets 
revived.
 The refinancing operations were an indirect way of purchasing sovereign debt in the 
new issuance market, something the Eurosystem is forbidden to do directly. The 
likely intent was for periphery country banks to borrow long term at subsidised 
interest rates and then, through their own volition or the persuasion of their 
government, to use at least some of this money to purchase sovereign debt.
 The short-run success of the measure in reassuring financial market participants 
was probably due to its signal value. This new measure announced that there had 
indeed been a changing of the guard at the ECB and that the new management was 
prepared to do what it takes – within the confines of the Treaty – to calm sovereign 
debt markets and to prevent sovereign debt default or a collapse of systemically 
significant financial institutions.
 While market participants became more sanguine, the rise in balances at the ECB’s 
deposit facility suggests that banks are parking much of their increased liquidity at 
the central bank. If lending to the real economy is going to revive, the ECB must 
continue to demonstrate that it is playing its role in acting as lender of last resort 
and banks need to strengthen their balance sheets by raising more capital.
 The change in collateral standards was an initiative of more doubtful quality. 
Allowing individual central banks to take a more risky approach to lending on their 
own accounts raises the spectre of bankrupt central banks and sovereigns that 
cannot recapitalise them. As national banks have no other lender of last resort euro 
srea policy makers might have the disagreeable choice of letting the rest of the 
system recapitalise a failed national central bank or having a national banking 
system collapse.




On 8 December 2011 the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) 
announced two unprecedented policy measures to support bank lending and liquidity in the 
euro area money market. The key feature of the first measure announced was two longer-
term fixed-rate and full-allotment refinancing operations (LTROs) with a maturity of 36 
months and the option of early repayment after one year. The interest rates were set at the 
average rate of the main refinancing operations over the life of the respective operation.  
The allotment dates were 21 December 2011 and 29 February 2012. The second measure 
announced was an increase in the set of eligible collateral, achieved by reducing the rating 
threshold for some asset-backed securities and by temporarily allowing national central 
banks to accept performing bank loans satisfying specific eligibility criteria as collateral. 
2. THE NEW LTROS
In this section I discuss the first new measure: the longer-term LTROs. A total of 523 banks 
bid for EUR 489.2 billion in the first (21 December 2011) longer-term LTRO, while 800 
banks bid for EUR 529.5 billion in the second (29 February LTRO). Given that some 
previous shorter-term LTROs had matured, the total increase in liquidity from LTROs after 
the second operation was EUR 522.6 billion. 
2.1. The New LTROs and Bank Lending to the Real Economy
Although little time has passed since the announcement or carrying out of this non-
standard measure, it is interesting to evaluate the extent to which the ECB has advanced or 
might be expected to advance its objectives. To do this, one must first start by asking what 
the ECB’s objectives were. The ECB is emphatic that its primary goal was to increase bank 
lending. In a 9 February 2012 press conference ECB President Mario Draghi stated, “… as I 
have said repeatedly, our primary interest is in lending to the real economy.” While, it is 
likely that the long-term lending to euro area banks at a subsidised rate was more 
importantly intended to be a roundabout way of acting as a lender of last resort to euro 
area sovereigns and thus calming financial markets, I first consider how the LTROs may 
have influenced the retail market for bank loans.
It is not possible to quantify the impact of the ECB’s measures on lending to the real 
economy. Not enough time has passed for much data to be available and even in the longer 
run this is a near impossible exercise because of the difficulties in specifying the 
counterfactual in such an unconventional economic scenario. Consequently I will discuss 
the conditions in the retail lending market and suggest how the policy measures might 
have affected them or how they might be expected to affect them in the future.
2.1.1. Conditions in the retail market for bank loans before the new measures
Prior to the announcement of the new LTROs, it was clear that the growth in bank lending 
to the real economy was in marked decline. As shown in Figure 1, the annual growth in 
Monetary Financial Institution’s (MFIs) loans to households had been falling since 
September 2011 and loans to non-financial corporations had been in decline since October 
2011.
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Figure 1. Annual Growth in MFI Lending to 
Non-Financial Corporations and Households
___ Non-Financial Corporations ___ Households
Source: ECB, data is seasonally adjusted.
Not only had the growth in the volume of loans fallen, the terms and conditions had 
become harsher as well. The Euro Area Bank Lending Survey of January 2012 suggests that 
outside of Germany, euro area banks had significantly tightened their credit standards and 
raised interest rates on loans to non-financial firms and households in 2011 Q4. 
Small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) account for two-thirds of all corporate 
employment in the EU and are particularly dependent on bank funding.1 According to the 
SME’s Access to Finance Survey of December 2011, 87 percent of these firms that had 
received a loan in the past two years had obtained it from a bank. These firms listed access 
to finance as their second most pressing concern (after finding customers) and 27 percent 
said that banks had become less willing to loan over the past six months compared to only 
13 percent that said that banks had become more willing. 
2.1.2. Conditions in the retail market for bank loans after the new measures
It is clear that the announcement of the new LTROs did not suddenly cause bank lending to 
rebound, but there are small signs that after the announcement of the new measures the 
deterioration in the bank lending market became less pronounced. Annual growth in MFI’s 
loans to non-financial corporations has been declining steadily since November 2011, but 
the annual growth in MFI’s loans to households, which had fallen sharply from 2.1 percent 
in November 2011 to 1.5 percent in December 2011, declined a more moderate 0.2 and 
0.1 percentage points in January and February 2012, respectively. Looking ahead, the Euro 
Area Bank Lending Survey of January 2012 suggests that euro area Banks expect a further 
tightening of credit in 2012 Q1, but at a slower rate.
One reason for a levelling off of the decline in banking lending conditions might be the new 
LTROs provision of low-cost liquidity. There is some limited evidence that the ECB’s 
unconventional policies since the beginning of the financial crises have supported bank 
lending through an increased liquidity channel. Lenza, et al (2010), while acknowledging 
the difficulties inherent in such a study, estimate that previous non-standard policies should 
have had a positive impact on loans for house purchases and consumer loans. The overall 
                                               
1 SME’s Access to Finance Survey, December 2011, fn. 3, p. 3.
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impact on short-term loans to non-financial firms is less clear as an expected lagged 
improvement follows an estimated immediate decline in lending. 
It should be mentioned in this context that the design of the LTROs was rather clever. 
Holding two auctions gave banks that abstained from the first round out of fears of a 
stigma a second chance to borrow in the second. Many small banks that lend to SMEs 
joined the second round, when the details of collateral eligibility of individual bank loans 
had been worked out.
2.2. The Effect of the LTROS on Euro Area Financial Markets
Although the immediate impact of the new LTROs on bank lending seems to be muted, 
these operations appear to have at least temporarily stopped a fast deterioration in 
financial conditions in the euro area and in particular in bank funding markets and have 
also led to large increases in asset prices and some improvement in investor sentiment. If 
financial conditions continue to moderate, conditions in retail bank lending markets should 
as well. 
2.2.1. The LTROs calmed financial markets
A number of indicators suggest that tensions in financial markets have eased since the 
announcement of the new LTROs. As seen in Figure 2, the three-month Euribor rate 
(a reference rate based on the average rate that banks in the euro area make unsecured 
loans to each other) had been declining since October 2011, but the rate of decline 
quickened after early December 2011. As of 23 March 2012 the rate had declined to 0.808 
percent.
Figure 2. Three-Month Euribor
Source: Euribor-rates.eu, first day of each month
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Asset prices have risen substantially. As seen in Figure 3, the monthly average Dow Jones 
EURO STOXX (broad) index rose by 12.8 percent between November 2011 and February 
2012. The United States Standards & Poor’s 500 index rose by 10.3 percent and the 
Japanese Nikkei 225 rose by 8.7 percent.
Figure 3. Stock Market Indices (Monthly Averages, Feb 2011 =100)
Source: ECB
As seen in Figure 4, yields in the secondary markets for Italian and Spanish sovereign debt 
have come down considerably since their highs in November 2011. On 27 March 2012 the 
yields on 10-year Italian and Spanish debt had fallen to 5.0082 percent and 5.3116
percent, respectively.
Figure 4. Ten-Year Sovereign Debt Yields (Secondary Markets)
Source: ECB, period averages
On 27 Mar 2012 the Italian Treasury sold EUR 2.8 billion two-year bonds and the average 
yield was 2.35 percent, down from 3.01 percent a month earlier. On 1 Mar 2012 the 
Spanish Treasury sold EUR 4.5 billion bonds and the average yield on two-year debt was 
2.07 percent.
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2.2.2. The LTROs and the sovereign debt crisis
Both Spain and Italy’s fiscal situations are likely to be sustainable if their financing costs 
are low; however, if they face sufficiently high interest rates they will default. This leads to 
two possible equilibria based on self-fulfilling expectations. The first is a socially beneficial 
one where market participants believe that Spain and Italy will repay their debt, interest 
rates on Spanish and Italian sovereign debt remain low and, consequently, Spain and Italy 
remain solvent.  The second is a fear-driven outcome where market participants believe it 
is likely that Spain and Italy will default and interest rates on Spanish and Italian debt 
climb sharply; Spain and Italy are then forced into default. 
In a scenario where there are multiple equilibria in financial markets it is the proper role of 
central banks to ensure that the socially beneficial one prevails. They should be willing to 
act as lender of last resort to an illiquid but solvent bank and to avert a fear-driven run on 
sovereign debt that is not warranted by the fundamentals. If a country has its own 
currency then its central bank can be given the ability to stand ready to purchase new 
issuance of home-currency denominated sovereign debt that carries an excessively high 
yield. Unfortunately, in the euro area the Treaty forbids the Eurosystem from purchasing 
Member States’ sovereign debt in the primary issuer market. 
Endangered euro area sovereigns have other lenders of last resort: the European Financial 
Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and is 
successor the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and the International Monetary Fund. 
However, the size of the available funds is small relative to the periphery sovereigns 
funding requirements: see Buiter and Rahbari (2012) for a detailed analysis of this. 
Consequently, the ECB has been forced to intervene.
As the Eurosystem cannot directly purchase newly issued sovereign debt it has been forced 
to either purchase sovereign debt in the secondary market or to find a mechanism that 
allows the indirect purchase of newly issued debt. The first approach was attempted under 
the Securities Market Programme. It is inefficient, however, to cap the yield on the entire 
outstanding debt stock, which effectively requires an offer to purchase all outstanding 
sovereign debt at above-market prices, just to keep the yield on newly issued sovereign 
debt within bounds. The LTROs are an example of the second approach. The idea is that 
the ECB offers to lend money to banks at a subsidised rate and its offer is taken up by 
banks in the periphery countries which then, either through carry trade or the suasion of 
their governments, purchase their countries’ newly issued sovereign debt. 
The ECB, with its characteristic opacity, does not release the details of its transactions or 
even a country-by-country breakdown of borrowing; hence we are unsure of exactly which 
banks borrowed how much in the two new LTROs.2 Nevertheless there are indications that 
a large part of the funds went to periphery sovereigns. The Banca d’Italia stated that Italian 
banks took up EUR 139 billion of the EUR 529.5 billion that was borrowed in the second 
LTRO. Analysts at UBS estimate that Italian and Spanish banks took up a total of 
EUR 260 billion and EUR 250 billion, respectively, in the two LTROs and other Eurosystem 
liquidity offerings.3
                                               
2 Mario Draghi did say at the 8 March press conference that, “Of these [800 banks that borrowed in the second 
new LTRO], 460 are German banks, even though I should hasten to add the overall amount borrowed by German 
banks is lower, or much lower, than the overall amount borrowed by other countries.”
3 Cited in Milne, Richard and Mary Watkins, “By Piling on Funds to Save Banks, the Monetary Authorities may 
Initiate a Renewal of the Euro Crisis, Financial Times, 27 Mar 2012.
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Available data up through January 2012, shown in Figure 5, suggests that at the first LTRO 
was effective at increasing bank holding of Spanish and Italian government debt.
Figure 5. MFI’s (excluding the Eurosystem) Purchases of 
General Government Debt (EUR billions)
Source: ECB
Unfortunately, there are some problems associated with the LTROs. First, they are a less 
efficient way of acting as lender of last resort than intervening in primary sovereign debt 
markets would be. Only some of the money that is borrowed will be used to purchase 
fiscally endangered sovereigns’ debt. Second, since the borrowing is open to all of the 
ECB’s counterparties, this subsidised lending that is ultimately paid for by euro area tax 
payers is partially to the benefit of financial institutions outside the euro area. Several UK 
banks, for example, have helped themselves to funding through their euro area 
subsidiaries. Third, providing banks with large amounts of cheap liquidity may have the 
undesirable side effect of lessening their incentives to improve their balance sheets.
2.2.3. The LTROs and the wholesale market for bank funding
The on-going euro area sovereign debt crisis has weakened banks’ balance sheets, making 
banks riskier counterparties and it has lowered the value of the collateral that they use to 
secure additional funding. As the effect on individual bank balance sheets is imperfectly 
observable, adverse selection problems have magnified. The improved outlook for the 
sovereign debt crisis can be expected to improve conditions in the interbank lending 
market. Consistent with this, according to the Euro Area Bank Lending Survey of Jan 2012, 
banks expect some improvement in wholesale market funding in 2012 Q1. As banks’ 
assessment of their liquidity positions improves, so should their attitudes toward lending.
It is a beneficial side effect of the LTROs that additional liquidity is provided to the banking 
system, perhaps directly facilitating lending to the real economy. But, the real benefit is the 
normalisation of the wholesale funding market through the improvement of banks’ balance 
sheets and the lessening of adverse selection problems. It is primarily through this less 
direct channel that bank lending to the real economy can be expected to be more robust 
than it otherwise would have been.
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2.2.4. Why did the LTROs have such an impact?
The announcement of the new and unconventional measures was an important signal. 
Announced on 8 December, the day before the European Council meeting where Member 
States agreed on the outlines of the fiscal compact, it signalled to the market that there 
had indeed been a regime change at the ECB; that the new management was willing to be 
quite creative, within the constraints of its legal framework, to support periphery 
sovereigns. While saying that the LTROs were motivated by a desire to increase funding to 
the real economy, Mario Draghi has also emphasised their role in calming markets. He 
expressed his pleasure at the success of the operations in this regard, saying:
"The risk environment has improved enormously, markets have reopened, both senior 
and secure markets, covered bond markets, and even the interbank market – although 
still limited to the short term and to national boundaries – has also started working a 
little better. Certainly, we see many signs of a return of confidence in the euro. So-called 
real money investors have, to some extent, come back. We see the presence of money 
market funds, which were the first to take flight from the euro a year and a half ago. We 
see again pension funds, we see investment funds – so, all in all, we see that great 
progress has been achieved.  … basically, the LTRO had the powerful effect of removing 
what is called “tail risk” from the environment".4
2.2.5. What will happen next
It is apparent that the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy measures were a success in 
that they calmed turbulent financial markets in the short run. Undoubtedly some of this 
success was due to the action being perceived as a signal. It was not as successful as it 
might have been in increasing bank lending to the real sector, however, as much of the 
additional liquidity appears to have been parked at the Eurosystem deposit facility, as 
shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Eurosystem Deposit Facility (EUR billions)
Source: ECB
If the ECB is sufficiently forceful in doing what it takes to support sovereign debt markets, 
banks that took part in the LTROs may be further tempted into the carry trade. If market 
participants can be persuaded that the sovereign debt crisis is under control then the 
economic outlook will improve, Mario Draghi’s protestation that the increase in funds in the 
Eurosystem’s deposit facility is temporary will turn out to be correct and the retail bank 
                                               
4 Press Conference, 8 March 2012
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lending market will recuperate. If market participants adopt a less sanguine view, then in 
the long term the new LTROs are likely to be – at best -- just another example of 
ineffectual credit easing.
3. THE CHANGE IN COLLATERAL RULES
On 12 Dec 2011 the Governing Council announced that NCBs are allowed, as a temporary 
solution, to accept as collateral for Eurosystem credit operations additional performing 
credit claims that satisfy specific eligibility criteria. The responsibility for accepting such 
credit claims is to be borne by the National Central Bank (NCB) authorising their use. Seven 
NCBs, those of Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Austria and Portugal, put forward 
proposals and these were approved by the Governing Council on 9 February 2012.5
The new collateral rules have two significant features. First, collateral rules can now vary 
across countries. Second, while previously the losses from all Eurosystem operations 
undertaken for monetary policy purposes were shared across the Eurosystem according to 
ECB capital shares, the losses associated with a central bank now having collateral rules 
that are more lenient than that of the rest of the Eurosystem are to borne by that central 
bank.
There are two potentially undesirable consequence of this easing of standards. First, 
domestic banks in a country with abundant easy liquidity face a reduced incentive to clean 
up their balance sheets.
Second, while it has always been possible for a NCB to become insolvent, the new rules 
increase the likelihood of this happening. Given the Eurosystem’s current full-allotment 
procedures, an imprudent national central bank could sustain substantial losses. Suppose 
that a NCB did become insolvent. Its national government would be expected to 
recapitalise it, but if the sovereign itself were in dire straits this might not be possible. 
Under current rules, banks headquartered in that NCB’s country would then not be able to 
borrow from the Eurosystem. ECB policy makers would face the politically unpleasant 
question of whether to allow a national banking to fail or whether to have the rest of the 
Eurosystem absorb the losses.
                                               
5 Details of the proposals are on the NCBs websites. The central banks of Portugal, Cyprus, Spain, Italy and 
Austria lowered allowable credit quality by raising their acceptable probabilities of default. The central banks of 
France, Cyprus and Spain have permitted credit claims denominated in currencies other than the euro. The central 
banks of Ireland and France have said they will start accepting real estate and mortgage-backed loans and the 
central banks of Portugal and Cyprus lowered the minimum size.
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